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Trade and Industrial Policies with Heterogeneous Firms: 
The Role of Country Asymmetries
* 
 
This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies with 
heterogeneous firms. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade policies, 
infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one 
country have negative productivity and welfare effects on the trading partner. Second, 
symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions 
are inferior. Third, there are gains from trade even for a country whose monopolistically 
competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade. 
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1  Introduction 
Theories of heterogeneous firms and trade were developed in response to empirical challenges 
to old and new trade theory which emerged as micro-data sets allowed to track the production 
and trade at the firm level. The seminal works by Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and 
Kortum  (2003)  and  Yeaple  (2003)  provided  theoretical  explanations  for  the  findings  that 
exporting firms are a rare species and typically larger and more productive than nonexporting 
firms. In an explosion of work, the scope of these theories of heterogeneous firms and trade was 
then considerably expanded, in particular to include endowment-driven comparative advantage 
(Bernard, Redding and Schott 2007), competition effects (Melitz and Ottaviano 2008) and the 
repercussions between trade, FDI and labor markets.
1 
A more recent strand of research has started to address the policy implications of the theories of 
heterogeneous firms and trade. This paper contributes to this nascent literature. The distinctive 
feature of our analysis is the focus on country asymmetries. We consider an extensive list of 
factors  that  are  within  the  scope  of  trade  and  industrial  policies  and  that  determine  the 
conditions of doing business: technology access, market (country) size, market entry costs, exit 
rate,  fixed  costs  to  serve  (domestic  and  foreign)  markets,  the  trade  infrastructure,  and  also 
Ricardian productivity differences which imply that countries exhibit different wage levels. We 
use a two-sector version of the Melitz (2003) model in the spirit of the new trade theory with a 
competitive sector (‘traditional good’) in addition to the monopolistically competitive sector 
with heterogeneous firms (‘modern/manufacturing sector’). This allows us to integrate these 
country asymmetries in an analytically tractable and slim way.
2 
Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, we show that trade policies, infrastructure 
policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in one country, induce a 
positive selection effect and bring welfare gains to that country but have a negative welfare 
effect  on  the  trading  partner.  The  possibility  that  a  trading  partner  is  hurt  by  a  country’s 
technology improvements in the modern sector was noticed by Demidova (2008). However, we 
show  that  even  if  technology  potentials  are  identical  in  both  countries,  a  trading  partner 
experiences negative productivity and welfare effects due to a variety of differences in business 
                                                 
1 Helpman (2006) and Redding (2010) survey theses developments. Davis and Harrigan (2008), Eckel and Egger 
(2009), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding 
(2010a, 2010b) exemplify the labor market applications. 
2 This modelling strategy has been fruitfully be employed by Demidova (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), 
among others. 2 
conditions such as entry costs, exit probabilities and/or wages. Moreover, we show that these 
effects get magnified as trade gets freer. 
Second,  we  show  that  strong  asymmetric  productivity  and  welfare  effects  derive  from 
symmetric trade liberalization. Symmetric trade liberalization exerts a positive productivity and 
welfare effect on the country that has superior business conditions and a negative productivity 
and  welfare  effect  on  the  other  country.  Demidova  (2008)  has  noted  the  possibility  of 
immiserizing trade liberalization, but her analysis was confined to country differences in terms 
of their technology potential. We show that such technology differences are not necessary for 
such immiserization. Again, a very broad set of business conditions which are influenced by 
industrial policies may account for these asymmetric productivity and welfare effects. 
Third, while previous analyses of heterogeneous firms and trade have been confined to settings 
where the countries are diversified in production, we also study the case where the switch from 
autarky to trade drives one country into full specialization on the traditional good.
3 Our model 
plausibly predicts this to happen if countries are strongly asymmetric with respect to business 
conditions. For that case we show that there are gains from trade even for the country whose 
monopolistically competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from 
autarky to trade. We also show that there is no immiserization trade integration in this case. 
Apart from these novel conclusions, a further contribution of our analysis is to synthesize a 
number of previous policy findings. The tractability of our framework allows us to depict these 
in a very slim manner.  
Previous literature. Our paper is related to an emerging literature that explores policy issues in 
the standard model with heterogeneous firms by Melitz (2003). As we  have already noted, 
Demidova (2008) studies differences in the technology potential across countries.
4 Her work is 
the one most closely related to our analysis. We shall therefore explain in detail how our results 
deviate from her contribution, as we go along. Baldwin (2005) and Baldwin and Forslid (2006) 
are also related in that they study the welfare effects of trade integration, albeit in a model 
which lacks the comprehensive set of business conditions that we account for.
5 Demidova and 
Rodriguez-Clare (2009) study trade policy and welfare issues from the point of view of a small 
open economy. Hence, the international repercussions that emerge in a two-country setting that 
we  highlight  are  absent  in  their  paper.  Chor  (2009)  uses  a  two-country  model  but  focuses 
                                                 
3 The full specialization case has obtained much attention in neoclassical modelling of international trade, however. 
See e.g. Davis and Weinstein (2001) and Schott (2003). 
4 See also Falvey et al. (2005).  
5 Feenstra and Kee (2008) address welfare as well, before turning to their empirical analysis of the Melitz model. 3 
exclusively on FDI subsidies. Jorgenson and Schröder (2008) explore the effects of exogenous 
tariffs and Cole and Davis (2009) analyze optimal tariffs. Pflüger and Südekum (2009) study 
the non-cooperative and cooperative choice of entry subsidies. 
Our analysis is also related to Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) who study an alternative model 
which builds on the linear demand system with horizontal product differentiation developed by 
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). We build on the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework, in 
contrast. This brings a benefit but also a cost. The well-known cost is that the mark-ups are 
constant. On the benefit side, we gain additional tractability, which is of importance since we 
focus on country asymmetries along many more dimensions than those envisioned by Melitz 
and Ottaviano (2008).
6 Furthermore, neither they nor the other papers that we have referenced 
above consider the case where one country is completely specialized in production. 
Our paper is also related to the traditional literature on trade policies, infrastructure policies and 
industrial policies under imperfect competition (e.g. Venables 1987, Helpman and Krugman 
1987, Flam and Helpman 1987, Martin and Rogers 1995 and Baldwin et al. 2003). Of course, 
this  literature  ignores  the  heterogeneity  of  firms.  Nonetheless,  there  are  some  similarities 
between these works and our analysis that we explain as we proceed. 
The paper's structure is as follows. Our basic model is laid out in section 2. Section 3 derives 
the open economy equilibrium with two countries. Section 4 covers the gains from trade and our 
welfare and policy analyses under the usual assumption that both countries are diversified in 
production both before and after trade. Section 5 then turns to the case not yet addressed in the 
literature, where one country is forced into full specialization in the traditional industry. Section 
6 offers concluding remarks. 
2  The Model 
2.1  General set-up 
Our  model  is  based  on  a  version  of  the  standard  monopolistic  competition  model  with 
heterogeneous  firms  (Melitz  2003)  due  to  Demidova  (2008).  As  in  the  new  trade  theory 
(Helpman and Krugman 1985), there are two industries. A traditional industry, n, produces a 
homogeneous numéraire good under constant returns to scale and perfect competition, and a 
monopolistic competitive industry, c, produces a continuum of differentiated manufacturing 
                                                 
6 Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) address country differences concerning size and import barriers, only. Concerning 
the issue of tractability, it should be pointed out that the two-sector framework used by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) 
is already much more tractable than the original Melitz (2003) model. It is not as simple to use as our framework, 
however. 4 
varieties  under  increasing  returns.  Each  variety  is  produced  by  a  single  firm  and  firms  are 
heterogeneous in their productivity. Labor is the only factor of production in both industries. 
There are L workers who supply one unit of labor each. We consider an extensive list of factors 
which affect the conditions of doing business: we allow for country asymmetries concerning 
effective entry costs and exit rates, the fixed costs to serve domestic and foreign consumers, 
respectively, market (country) size, trade and transport infrastructure, Ricardian productivity in 
the  competitive  sector  and  the  access  to  manufacturing  technologies,  i.e.  the  technology 
potential. We first look at a single country in autarky. 
2.2  Preferences 
Household h’s preferences are defined over the homogenous good and the set of differentiated 
varieties,  W Î z , according to a logarithmic quasi-linear utility function with CES sub-utility
7 
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where  1 0 < < r  and  0 > b  are constant parameters and where  ( ) z q
h  expresses household h's 
consumption of variety  z . The elasticity of substitution between any two varieties is given by 
1 ) 1 /( 1 > - º r s . It is well-known from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that 
h c  can be understood as 
the consumption of the manufacturing aggregate with aggregate price 
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The budget constraint of h is 
h h h y n c P = + , where 
h y  denotes income. Utility maximization 
implies that per-capita expenditure on the manufacturing aggregate and the numéraire are given 
by  b =
h c P  and  b - =
h h y n , respectively and indirect utility is  ) 1 (ln ln - + - = b b b P y v
h h . 
Since households are identical we drop the index h from now on. We assume  y < b  in order to 
ensure that the demand for the homogeneous good is non-negative. Aggregate demand for a 
single  variety  z  is  given  by  L P z p z q b
s s 1 ) ( ) (
- - = ,  and  total  revenue  for  that  variety  is 
[ ] L z p P z q z p z r b
s 1 ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) (
- = = . Overall manufacturing expenditure, PcL , equals  L b . 
2.3  Production and pricing 
In the numéraire-sector a units of labor are transformed into one unit of output. This pins down 
the wage,  a w / 1 = . Technologies in the modern sector are such that  j / q f l + =  units of labor 
                                                 
7 Demidova (2008) assumes a Cobb-Douglas upper tier utility function rather than a logarithmic quasi-linear one. 5 
are needed to produce q units of output. The fixed overhead labor  f  is the same for all firms, 
but the variable labor requirement ( ) j / 1  differs across firms. Firms have zero mass. Each firm 
thus  faces  a  residual  demand  curve  with  constant  price  elasticity  of  demand  s - .  Profit 
maximization implies that a firm with marginal cost ( j / w ) charges the price: 
         








) (         (3) 
Revenue and profits of this firm are then given by  ( ) ( )
1 /
- =
s rj b j w P L r  and  f w r - = s j p / ) ( , 
respectively. Hence, a firm with higher productivity level j  charges a lower price, sells a larger 
quantity and has higher revenue and profits. Since all firm-specific variables differ only with 
respect to j , the CES price index (2) can be rewritten as  
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where M  denotes the mass of manufacturing firms (and varieties) in the market,  ( ) j m  is the 
productivity distribution across these active firms with positive support over a subset of ( ) ¥ , 0  
and j ~  is an average productivity level as introduced by Melitz (2003). 
2.4  Entry and exit 
There exists a mass of potential entrepreneurs who can enter the manufacturing sector subject to 
a sunk entry investment in terms of labor  e f . At each point in time a mass of 
E M  entrepreneurs 
decides to enter. Upon  entry these entrepreneurs learn about their productivity j , which is 
drawn from a common and known density function  ) (j g  with support ( ) ¥ , 1  and cumulative 
density function  ) (j G . Call this the 'productivity lottery'. After the productivity is revealed, an 
entrant can decide to exit immediately or to remain active in the market, in which case the firm 
earns  constant  per-period  profits  ( ) j p .  It  will  exit  immediately  if  ( ) ( ) f w r s j j p < « < 0 . 
Only those firms remain active whose productivity draw exceeds the cutoff  0
* > j  at which 
profits are zero,  ( ) 0
* = j p . Once in the market, every firm may be hit with constant probability 
d  by  a  lethal  shock  which  forces  it  to  shut  down  and  exit.
8 We  focus  on  a  stationary 
equilibrium  without  time  discounting  such  that  in  each  period  the  mass  of  entrants  which 
successfully enter the market equals the mass of firms that are forced to shut down. Analytically, 
M M prob
E
i d = , where  ( )
* 1 j G probi - º  is the probability to draw a productivity no smaller 
                                                 
8 We follow Melitz (2003) and assume that once a firm is hit by a lethal shock it leaves the market instantaneously. 
See e.g. Hopenhayn (1992) for a dynamic analysis of firm exit. 6 
than the cutoff 
* j . The endogenous productivity distribution among surviving firms,  ( ) j m , is 
thus the conditional (left-truncated) ex-ante distribution  ) (
* j g  on the domain [ ) ¥ ,
* j . 
2.5  Equilibrium in the closed economy and parameterization 
The equilibrium within the manufacturing sector can be characterized as in Melitz (2003) by 
two conditions, a free entry condition (FEC) and a zero cutoff profit condition (ZCPC). 
To derive the FEC note that, assuming risk neutrality, potential entrepreneurs enter the market 
(i.e. incur the entry cost  e f w  to participate in the productivity lottery) until the value of entry 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] e e
t









d j j j p j j p d / 1 1
* *
0
 is  driven  to  zero.  Using 
wf r - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ~ ~ /
1r r
- =  where  [ ]
) 1 /( 1 * 1 ~ - - > º
s s j j j E j  is  a  measure  of 
average  productivity,  and  imposing  0 =
E v ,  the  FEC  can  be  derived  as 
( ) [ ] ) ( 1 / ~ * j d j p G f w e - = .  The  ZCPC  states  that  the  cutoff  firm  makes  zero  profits, 
( ) ( ) f w r s j j p = « =
* * 0 .  Using  ( ) ( ) [ ] f w r - = s j j p / ~ ~  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) j j j j
s ~ ~ /
1 * * r r
-
= ,  this 
condition  can  also  be  expressed  as  a  function  of  the  average  productivity  level  j ~ : 
( ) ( ) [ ] f w 1 / ~ ~ 1 * - =
- s
j j j p . The equilibrium is determined by the cutoff productivity 
* j  which 
simultaneously satisfies the FEC and the ZCPC. In order to conform to the empirical evidence 
and  to  obtain  closed-form  solutions  we  assume  Pareto-distributed  productivities, 
( )
k G j j j / 1 ) ( min - =  and  ( )
1
min ' ) (
- - = =
k k k G g j j j j  where  0 min > j  is  the  lower  bound  for 
productivity draws and  1 > k  is the shape parameter.
9 The ex post probability of productivities 
is then conditional on successful market entry,  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 1 * * 1 /
+ - = - =
k k
k G g j j j j j m  if 
* j j >  
and  ( ) 0 = j m  otherwise.  Moreover,  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k ,  where  we  assume  1 - >s k . 
Using these expressions in FEC and ZCPC yields the autarky equilibrium cutoff: 
























j           (5) 
The equilibrium cutoff is independent of the number of workers L, positively related to the 
elasticity of substitution s , the fixed labor  f  to serve the market and the lower bound  min j  and 
                                                 
9 For empirical support see e.g. Del Gatto et al. (2006) and Ikeda and Suoma (2009). The Melitz-model with the 
Pareto-parameterization has been popularized by Bernard et al. (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Baldwin (2005), 
Helpman et al. (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). 7 
negatively related to the fixed investment of labor at the entry stage  e f , the death rate d , as 
well as the Pareto-shape parameter k , as in Melitz (2003) and Demidova (2008).
10 Moreover, 
*
aut j  is  unaffected  by  the  labor  coefficient  in  the  competitive  sector  a  since  this  coefficient 
affects  the  wage  and  hence  the  fixed  costs  both  to  enter  and  serve  the  market  equi-
proportionately. We show below that countries' labor coefficients affect the cutoffs in the open 
economy equilibrium, however.  
Once the equilibrium cutoff is determined, all other endogenous variables are easily derived 
(see  appendix  A).  The  autarky  price  level  which  we  need  for  future  reference  is  given  by 
( )
( ) ( )( )
* 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / aut aut w f L P rj s b
s s s - - =  and the indirect utility of a household is then: 








































w v     (6) 
Countries with a greater endowment of labor L and a higher cutoff are better off. Moreover, it 
is readily derived that wage increases resulting from productivity increases in the numéraire 
sector raise (lower) the indirect utility iff ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 / / 1 - < > s s b a . 
3  The Open Economy 
3.1  Assumptions  
We now turn to an open economy setting with two countries  [ ] F H j i , , Î , say home H  and 
foreign  F .  These  two  countries  potentially  differ  in  a  number  of  characteristics  which 
determine the conditions to do business. There may be differences in country size  i L  and in the 
labor coefficient in the competitive sector  i a . Technologies in the manufacturing sector may be 
different: we assume that entrants in country i draw their productivity from a country-specific 
Pareto-distribution with common shape parameter k  but with potentially different lower bounds, 
i min j .
11 Exit rates  i d  may also be asymmetric. We also allow the fixed labor input for entry in 
the manufacturing sector  i e f ,  and the fixed labor input  i f  to serve domestic markets to differ 
                                                 
10 The statements concerning  min j  and k  refer to versions of the Melitz-model with Pareto-distributed 
productivities (cf. the references in footnote 4). 
11 Demidova's (2008) treatment of productivity differences in the manufacturing sector is more general than ours. 
She allows for general country-specific productivity distributions  ( ) j i G  which may dominate the productivity 
distribution  ( ) j j G  of the other country in terms of the hazard rate order. Since we consider further asymmetries 
and since we want to keep the model tractable, we have chosen to sacrifice some generality here. 8 
across countries. If (after learning its productivity  i j ) a firm from country i decides to export 
to region  j  it faces an additional country-specific fixed cost  xi f , on top of the domestic per-
period fixed costs  i f  that accrue irrespectively of export status. Moreover, firms have to incur 
variable iceberg costs to serve foreign consumers: for one unit to arrive in  j , a firm from 
country i has to ship  1 > ij t  units. We shall allow for the possibility that  ji ij t t ¹ , e.g. due to 
different trade policies or trade infrastructures. Trade in the competitive sector is costless. As 
long as both countries produce this good, an assumption that we shall maintain throughout the 
paper,  the  law  of  one  price  dictates  that  the  foreign  wage  is  tied  to  the  domestic  wage, 
F H H F a a w w W / / = º  where W  denotes the relative foreign wage. Note that  i i a w / 1 =  by our 
choice of the numéraire. Hence, we do not impose factor prize equalization. 
3.2  Domestic cutoffs and export cutoffs 
Following  the  approach  pioneered  in  Demidova  (2008)  we  now  derive  the  domestic  cutoff 
productivities 
*
H j  and 
*
F j  drawing on the conditions of free entry and zero cutoff profits which 
become interdependent across countries in the open economy. If a manufacturing firm from 
country  i  exports  to  country  j ,  its  profits  from  exporting  are  given  by 
xi i xi xi f w r × - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  where  j j i ij xi L P w r b rj t j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is the export revenue. There is a 
critical productivity threshold 
*
xi j  where such a firm just breaks even on the export market, i.e. 
xi i xi xi xi xi f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* * . We call this the export ZCPC. Furthermore, a manufacturing 
firm  from  country  i  that  serves  her  home  market  i  derives  profits  i i i i f w r - = s j j p / ) ( ) (  
where  i i i i L P w r b j r j
s s 1 1 ) / ( ) (
- - =  is  the  associated  revenue.  The  cutoff 
*
i j  where  this  firm 
breaks even is defined by  i i i i i i f w r s j j p = Û = ) ( 0 ) (
* * . We call this the domestic ZCPC. The 
revenue  equations  imply  a  link  between  export  cutoffs  and  domestic  cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where  ( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t j xi ij i f f t  (see  appendix  B). 
Throughout the paper we impose the assumption  ( ) ( )
1 * * 1 / / /
- - >
s s s j j t j i i j ij j xi w w f f  to ensure that 
only firms that produce in the domestic market can export (i.e.  i xi j j >
* ). 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i commands that firms enter the market until the 
value  of  entry  is  zero,  ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ei i xi i xi xi i i i i f w prob prob = > + >
* * j j d j p E j j d j p E .  The  first 
term on the LHS formalizes the expected profits on the domestic market and the second term 9 
expresses  expected  profits  on  the  export  market  where  ) ( 1
*
xi i xi G prob j - º  denotes  the 
probability for a productivity draw high enough to enter the export market. The RHS expresses 
the entry costs. Using the FECs and the domestic and export ZCPC for each of the two countries, 
employing  the  links  between  export  cutoffs  and  domestic  cutoffs,  and  imposing  the  Pareto 
parameterization the equilibrium cutoff productivities are derived as (see appendix C): 
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( ) ( ) 1 / 1 /
- + - - º




ij i f f  are  measures  of  trade  openness  which  rise  as  variable 
trade costs  ij t  and the fixed cost ratio  j xi f f /  (i.e. the fixed cost that a firm from i  faces to 
serve the foreign market in relation to the fixed costs of a foreign competitor) fall. We shall 






w f W T DF
e  
captures international differences (ratios) concerning exit rates  H F D d d / º , entry investments 
eH eF e f f F / º ,  technologies  in  the  manufacturing  sector  as  proxied  by  the  respective  lower 
productivity  bounds  of  the  Pareto-distribution  F H T min min /j j º  and  wage  differentials 
F H H F a a w w W / / = º  caused by productivity differences in the competitive sector. 
w fe , , , min j d D  
rises when home business conditions turn in favor of domestic firms (i.e. when market entry 
becomes less expensive in home or market exit is less probable, when technological conditions 
are such that the domestic productivity lottery 'dominates' the foreign one, or when domestic 
wages fall relative to foreign wages).  
Absent international differences in business conditions (with  1
, , , min =
w fe j d D  and  F = F = F F H ) 





* 1 F j j + =  both for H  and for F  as in Melitz (2003). When 
we allow for country asymmetries, we have to impose the condition  F
w f
H
e F D F
j d > >
, , , min / 1  to 
ensure meaningful solutions (such that  0
* > i j  for  F H i , = ). Intuitively, the overall business 
conditions for the manufacturing sectors in the two countries must not be too different. Notice 
that it clearly is conceivable that business conditions are so disparate that a country, call it the 
'laggard', is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry and that all manufactures 
are produced in the 'leading' country. We take this case up in section 5.  10 
Once  the  domestic  equilibrium  cutoffs  are  determined,  the  export  cutoffs  are  immediately 
implied by the links 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - = . The conditional probability 
to become an exporter in country i can then be derived from  ( )
k
xi i i xi xi prob prob cprob
* */ / j j = º . 
The average productivity of domestic firms  i j ~  and the average productivity of exporting firms 
xi j ~  follow  from  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~
i i k k j s j
s- - - =  and  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~
xi xi k k j s j
s- - - = .  Finally,  the 
average profits can be calculated as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) xi xi i
i








1 ~ ~ ~
s
s
j p j p j p . 
3.3  Trade balance and open economy equilibrium 
To complete the characterization of the open economy equilibrium we have to impose balanced 
trade. From the perspective of the domestic economy, this is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H H H H H xF xF F xF xH xH H xH a L L w r M cprob r M cprob / 1 ~ ~ g b j j - - - + =     (8) 
The LHS of eq. (8) gives the value of country H 's manufacturing exports and the first term on 
the RHS gives the value of manufacturing imports. The second and third term on the RHS are 
the values of domestic consumption and production of the traditional good, respectively. Any 
imbalance  in  trade  in  manufacturing  must  be  matched  by  a  trade  surplus  or  deficit  in  this 
numéraire. The resulting firm masses are derived and reported in appendix C. Country i's CES 
price  index  is  given  by  ( ) ( ) ( )

















+ = ∫ ∫ d M p d M p P xj xj j ji i i i i  which  can  be 
rewritten as  ( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s  (see appendix D). The indirect utility follows as: 
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4  Welfare and Policy Analysis 
This section assumes that the two countries are diversified in production before and after trade. 
Section 5 covers the case where one country becomes fully specialized on the traditional good. 
Section 4.1 begins with the gains from trade. The policy analyses that we perform in sections 
4.2. to 4.5 start from an international equilibrium as characterized in section 3. First we take up 
trade and infrastructure policies that are unilaterally performed by one country (section 4.2.) and 11 
then address symmetric trade liberalization (section 4.3). Section 4.4 addresses the effects of 
industrial policies and section 4.5. highlights the trade cost sensitivity of such policies. 
4.1  The gains from trade 
The  welfare  effect  of  opening  up  an  economy  from  the  state  of  autarky  to  trade  is 
unambiguously positive as stated in 
PROPOSITION 1. (Gains from trade). Both countries have higher welfare under free trade 
than under autarky. 
Proof. Proposition 1 is immediately implied by eqs. (7) and (9). By (7) the equilibrium cutoffs 
are higher in the two countries under trade than under autarky. The price level is then lower in 
both countries under trade than under autarky. This entails by eq. (9) that welfare (indirect 
utility) is higher under trade than under autarky,  0 > - aut i v v . ■ 
Proposition 1 generalizes previous findings. Melitz (2003) has proved the gains from trade for 
the case of identical countries and Demidova (2008) has extended this proof to the case of 
countries  which  are  asymmetric  with  respect  to  technologies  in  the  modern  sector.  We 
generalize this result to economies which are asymmetric with respect to a comprehensive set of 
factors that determine the conditions to do business. In our generalized model, the welfare gain 
associated with the move from autarky to trade derives fully from the selection effect which 
drives up the productivity cutoffs as described in Melitz (2003). 
4.2  Unilateral trade integration and infrastructure policies 
We now turn to analyze the effects associated with a reduction of trade costs between the two 
countries.  We  start  with  the  case  of  unilateral  trade  integration  where  one  country  (say  j ) 
allows firms located in i better access to its consumers. This is captured by an increase in  i F  
which may stem either from reductions in variable trade costs  ij t  and/or from reductions in the 
fixed export costs  xi f . Our results are summarized in: 
PROPOSITION  2.  (Welfare  gains  and  losses  from  unilateral  trade  integration).  (i)  A 
unilateral reduction in trade costs to serve market  j  (captured by  0 > Fi d ) leads to welfare 
gains in country i and welfare losses in country  j . (ii) The effect of unilateral trade integration 
on country i's productivity is the stronger, the more favorable are the business conditions in i 
relative to  j . 12 
Proof. To prove the first part of proposition 2 first note that, by  eq.  (7),  0 /
* > F ¶ ¶ i i j  and 
0 /
* < F ¶ ¶ i j j . Taking this into account in the indirect utility, eq. (9), immediately implies our 






















The intuition behind proposition 2(i) is the following. Granting firms located in country i better 
access  to  consumers  located  in  country  j  raises  the  profitability  to  produce  manufacturing 
varieties in country i. This stimulates entry and tightens competition in i. The least productive 
firms  are  driven  out  of  the  market  in  i  and  the  cutoff  is  raised.  This  benefits  domestic 
consumers. Firms in i also gain a competitive advantage over firms located in  j . The foreign 
market becomes less profitable for local (foreign) firms. This reduces the incentive for foreign 
firms to enter the market. Competition is thus weakened resulting in a reduction in the foreign 
productivity cutoff which negatively affects the welfare of foreign consumers.  
The  results  comprehended  by  proposition  2(i)  involve  trade  and  infrastructure  policies. 
Reductions in variable trade costs ( 0 < ij dt ) can both be thought of as being due to lower 
import tariffs or similar trade costs or due to infrastructure policies (such as greater and more 
efficient harbors or airports) in country  j . 
Proposition 2(ii) carries an important message for trade negotiations: it reveals that the incentive 
to  request  better  market  access  to  a  foreign  country  rises  the  more  favorable  is  one's  own 
business environment. 
4.3  Symmetric trade integration 
We now turn to the case of a symmetric reduction in trade costs  0 > F = F F H d d . Note that 
this comprehends a reduction in variable (iceberg) trade costs and/or a reduction in fixed costs 
to serve the foreign market (since  0 / < ¶ F ¶ ij i t  and  0 / < ¶ F ¶ xi i f , respectively). We obtain: 
PROPOSITION  3.  (Welfare  gains  and  losses  from  symmetric  trade  integration).  A 
symmetric  reduction  in  trade  costs  ( 0 > F = F F H d d )  leads  to  an  immiserization  of  one 
country and welfare gains in the other country if  ( ) ( )
2 , , , 1 /
min
H F H
w fe F F F D
j d + + <  (then H  loses) 
or  if  ( ) ( ) F H F
w fe F F F D
j d + + > / 1
2 , , , min  (then  F  loses).  Otherwise  both  countries  reap  welfare 
gains. 13 
Proof.  A  country'  welfare  rises  (falls)  when  the  productivity  cutoff  rises  (falls).  Totally 
differentiate  ( ) j i i i F F = ,
* * j j ,  take  the  derivatives  of  the  equilibrium  cutoffs  i i F ¶ ¶ /
* j  and 
j i F ¶ ¶ /
* j  for  j i, , impose  0 > F = F F H d d , and then explore the sign of the derivatives. ■ 
This  proposition  delivers  the  important  result  that  the  possibility  of  immiserization  through 
trade integration that was first noted by Demidova (2008, proposition 1) is far more general than 
conceived by her. Demidova allows technology potentials in the manufacturing sector to differ 
across countries and she shows that it is possible that the 'laggard' (the country with the inferior 
technology  potential)  may  lose  from  falling  trade  costs.  We  generalize  this  result  in  two 
important dimensions.  
First, we show that asymmetric business conditions in a much more comprehensive sense are 
accountable  for  the  possibility  of  immiserization.  In  fact,  there  is  the  possibility  of 
immiserization even without differences in technology potentials in the modern sector. To see 
this  consider  the  case  where  country  F  is  the  laggard  and  H  is  the  leading  country  and 






w f W T DF
e .  Then  note  that  the  condition 
( ) ( ) F H F
w fe F F F D
j d + + > / 1
2 , , , min  can  be  fulfilled  even  if  1 / min min = º F H T j j ,  indicating 
identical technology potentials
12, if entry investments are relatively more favorable in country 
H  (i.e. if  eH eF e f f F / º  exceeds unity strongly enough), the default risk in H  is relatively low 
(i.e. if  H F D d d / º exceeds unity strongly enough) and/or wages are relatively low in country H  
(i.e.  F H H F a a w w W / / = º  exceeds unity strongly enough) such that the left-hand side (LHS) is 
large. Moreover note that this condition is more easily fulfilled if the right-hand side (RHS) is 
small, which is the case if firms from H  have easy access to consumers in F  (i.e.  H F  is large) 
or, when trade costs are identical and low (i.e. high  H F F = F ). Moreover, the RHS is low, if it 
is difficult for firms from F  to accede consumers in H .
13 Also note that size differences as 
proxied by the number of workers,  H L  and  F L , are inconsequential.
14  
                                                 
12 Remember that Demidova (2008) allows technology potentials to differ in a general sense. Our specification 
which only involves the support of the technology distribution suffices to make the point, however. 
13 Caveat: this holds when  ( ) 0 1 2
2 < F - - F F F F H . 
14 The inconsequentiality of country size was already found in Baldwin and Forslid (2006), see also Baldwin 
(2005). However, these authors concluded that symmetric trade integration must raise welfare in both countries. 
This difference to our findings can be explained by noting that these authors did neither account for differences in 
technology potentials nor the comprehensive set of business conditions that we highlight. 14 
Second, our analysis is general in the sense that we allow the symmetric trade integration to 
proceed from an initial situation where firms face different conditions to accede consumers in 
the other country, i.e.  H F  and  F F  may differ in the initial equilibrium. 
4.4  Industrial policies and business conditions in the open economy 
Industrial  policies  have  a  direct  effect  on  business  conditions.  Business  conditions,  in turn, 
impact on the productivity of firms and on country welfare under international trade. We have: 
PROPOSITION 4. (The effect of industrial policies and business conditions under trade). 
Lower domestic entry investments  ei f , lower labor productivity in the traditional sector  i a / 1 , a 
lower default risk  i d  and/or greater technological potential  i min j  in country i raises the cutoff 
productivity and welfare in this country and decreases productivity and welfare in country  j .  
Proof.  This  proposition  follows  immediately  by  considering  the  effects  of  changes  in  ei f , 
i a / 1 , i d  and  i min j  on eq. (7) and (9). ■ 
Intuitively, any improvement in business conditions in country i, such as a better technology 
potential,  lower  entry  investments,  a  lower  exit  probability  and/or  lower  wages,  raises  the 
profitability of the domestic market and gives local firms a competitive edge over their foreign 
competitors.  This  stimulates  entry  in  country  i  and  reduces  the  incentive  to  enter  the 
manufacturing industry in country  j , which sets in a selection effect that leads to higher cutoffs 
and  welfare  in  i  and  lower  cutoffs  and  welfare  in  j  (similarly  to  the  case  of  unilateral 
improvements in market access that we discussed before).  
Proposition  4  provides  a  considerable  generalization  of  the  finding  that  productivity 
improvements in one country hurt the other country (Demidova 2008, proposition 2). In fact our 
proposition shows that the very same result holds with respect to competitive advantages due to 
lower wages, a lower exit risk and easier market entry. Importantly, we show that asymmetric 
effects on productivities and on welfare obtain in the two countries even without differences in 
technology potentials that were envisioned by Demidova (2008). 
In contrast to the factors considered in proposition 4 the effect of changes in the domestic fixed 
labor input necessary to serve the domestic market has an ambiguous effect on the domestic 
productivity cutoff, but an unambiguous effect on welfare as stated in:  15 
PROPOSITION 5. (The effect of domestic fixed labor input under trade). An increase in 
domestic fixed labor inputs ( i f ) leads to (i) an increase in the domestic productivity cutoff iff 
the  domestic  market  is  sufficiently  protected  from  foreign  competition,  i.e.  iff 
( ) ( ) s s F F - - < k F H / 1 ,  (ii)  unambiguous  welfare  losses  in  country  i ,  and  (iii)  an 
unambiguous increase in the cutoff productivity and welfare in country  j . 
Proof. The method of proof follows the one employed to prove the previous proposition. ■ 
Proposition 5 shows a remarkable difference to our finding for the closed economy.  In the 
closed economy, an increase in  f  necessarily drives up the productivity cutoff (see eq. (5)) due 
to a stronger selection effect which drives the least efficient firm out of the market. In the open 
economy, an increase in  i f  has a further effect, it facilitates the access of foreign firms to the 
domestic market, as  0 / > i j df dF . This implies a competitive disadvantage for domestic firms 
vis-à-vis their foreign competitors whose effect it is to reduce the productivity cutoff. This leads 
to the ambiguity. However, the effect on domestic welfare is unambiguously negative, as the 
increase  in  the  fixed  labor  input  reduces  the  domestic  number  of  firms  ti M  and  hence  the 
product  variety  available.  Furthermore,  the  impact  on  foreign  productivity  and  welfare  is 
positive, as firms from  j  now enjoy a comparative advantage. 
Propositions 4 and 5 are of crucial importance from a policy perspective. Fixed investments that 
are  needed  to  enter  and  serve  the  domestic  market  and  the  technology  potential  can  be 
influenced by industrial policy. For example the necessary fixed investments to start and do 
business are associated with a country's level of corruption, the costs to enforce contracts, the 
costs to provide protection against crime, product piracy and product imitation. Technology 
policies have an influence on a country's technological potential. Crucially, any improvement 
from the point of view of one economy has a negative welfare effect on the other economy.  
4.5  Trade cost sensitivity of industrial policies 
Policymakers  should  be  aware  of  how  sensitive  the  effects  of  industrial  policies  (noted  in 
propositions 4 and 5) are with respect to the level of trade integration. We can show: 
PROPOSITION 6. (Trade cost sensitivity of policies). (i) Consider the effect of changes in 
country i's technology potential, fixed market entry investment, exit rate or wage rate on the 
domestic productivity cutoff (as captured by 
* */ i i d j j ). (i-a) Suppose  F = F = F H F . The effect 
of any such change is the greater, the greater is the level of trade freeness (F). (i-b) Suppose 16 
H F F ¹ F . The effect of any such change is the greater, the higher is  i F , i.e. the better is the 
market access of firms from country i to market  j . The effect of any such change is insensitive 
to  j F .  (ii)  Consider  the  effect  of  changes  in  country i 's  fixed  labor  input  on  the  domestic 
productivity cutoff. (ii-a) If  ( ) ( ) s s F F - - < k F H / 1 , changes in the domestic productivity get 
smaller by trade integration. (ii-b) Otherwise, the effect on the domestic productivity cutoff is 
the greater, the higher is  i F . 
Proof. The proposition follows from differentiation of eq. (7). ■ 
Part (i-a) of proposition 6 carries the important message that the impact of policies that affect 
the conditions to do business is magnified when the general level of trade freeness is higher. 
This  finding  has  previously  been  obtained  in  models  of  the  new  trade  theory  and  the  new 
economic geography with homogeneous firms (cf. Helpman and Krugman 1985; Baldwin et al. 
2003), the underlying mechanism being the same one as here. Our analysis extends this result to 
a  comprehensive  set  of  factors  affecting  business  conditions.  Part  (i-b)  of  proposition  6  is 
entirely novel. It reveals that domestic policies are more powerful when domestic firms have 
easy access to foreign markets. Part (ii-a) reveals that if a country is sufficiently protected from 
international trade (i.e., if  ( ) ( ) s s F F - - < k F H / 1  holds true), the (positive) impact of higher 
fixed labor inputs on the domestic productivity is smaller at higher levels of trade freeness. In 
case  (ii-b),  where  the  country  is  sufficiently  exposed  to  international  trade  (i.e.,  if 
( ) ( ) s s F F - - > k F H / 1 ), it becomes evident that trade integration even magnifies the (negative) 
impact of higher domestic fixed labor inputs. 
5  Full specialization in the traditional industry 
Our  analysis  has  so  far  rested  on  the  assumption  that  the  two  countries  are  diversified  in 
production  both  under  autarky  and  under  trade,  each  country  is  assumed  to  have  an  active 
manufacturing sector in addition to a traditional industry. However, we have already noted that 
it  is  conceivable  that  one  country  (the  'laggard')  may  be  forced  into  specialization  in  the 
traditional industry if asymmetries are very strongly in favor of doing business in the other 
country (the 'leading economy'). This section considers this possibility. We shall assume that the 
'leading country' is still diversified in production. We highlight the key results here and refer the 
reader to appendix E for an extended technical exposition of this case. 17 
Condition for specialization. We start out with an exploration of the condition under which 
one country is driven into full specialization in the traditional industry. Using eq. (D1) and 
imposing  0 ³ i M ,  both  countries  have  manufacturing  producers  if  H
L
F F D F
j / 1
* , < < .  By 
substituting  ( ) ( ) H
w f
F
w f L e e F D F D l D
j d j d j × - - × º
, , , , , , , min min
*
1 ,  where  F H L L / º l  is  the  ratio  of 
labor  endowment  in  H relative  to  F ,  and  solving  for 
w fe , , , min j d D ,  this  condition  for  non-
specialization in both countries can be rewritten as
15 
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Outside this range, one country will be fully specialized in the production of the traditional good: 
country  H  is  fully  specialized  if  ( ) ( ) F H F
w fe F F l l F D
j d + + < / 1
, , , min  and  country  F  is  fully 
specialized if  ( ) ( ) [ ] H F H
w fe F l F F l D
j d × + + > 1 / 1
, , , min . On inspection of these conditions we see 
that countries are fully specialized on the homogeneous good if business conditions are strongly 
against doing business in that economy (i.e. if wages are high, the economy is small, fixed 
investments needed for domestic and foreign market supply are high, entry investment is high, 
the exit rate is high, the technology potential is weak and trade access is difficult).  
Gains  from  trade.  The  switch  from  autarky  to  trade  may  force  one  country  into  full 
specialization in the traditional industry. Even in this case there are gains from trade to both 
countries, however. We can state:  
PROPOSITION  7.  (Gains  from  trade  under  specialization).  Both  countries  have  higher 
welfare under international trade than under autarky even if trade opening forces one country 
into full specialization in the traditional industry whereas the other country is diversified in 
production. 
Proof. Since we assume that both countries produce the traditional good both under autarky and 
under trade (such that a consumer has the same wage under autarky and trade), the welfare 
comparison boils down to a comparison of the price levels. We show in appendix E that even if 
a country is forced into full specialization by opening up to trade, its price level is lower than 
under autarky (where it produces both types of goods). The country which produces both types 
of goods has a lower price level for the same reason as in proposition 1. Hence, it holds true for 
that  0 , , > - i aut i s v v  for both countries. ■ 
                                                 
15 This restriction binds more strongly than the restriction for meaningful cutoff productivities (see section 3.2.). 18 
To the best of our knowledge, proposition 7 is entirely novel. The country which is driven into 
full  specialization  in  the  traditional  industry  benefits  from  the  productivity  increase  of  the 
trading partner. Our proposition shows that this beneficial effect is so strong that it compensates 
for the fact that the ‘laggard’ country has to incur trade costs for all manufacturing goods. 
No immiserizing trade integration with full specialization. Proposition 3 which was derived 
under the assumption that both countries are diversified in production showed that one country 
may experience immiserization under trade integration. This result no longer holds true under 
specialization.  In fact, it is immediate to see that a country that is and remains specialized 
during trade integration always experiences welfare gains through trade cost savings. We thus 
have: 
PROPOSITION 8. (No immiserization under trade integration). If trade opening forces one 
country  into  full  specialization  in  the  traditional  industry  whereas  the  other  country  is 
diversified in production, no country is worse off by trade integration. 
Proof: The welfare of a country increases when the price level falls. Use the price indices under 
specialization (as stated in appendix E) to see that they do not rise by trade integration. ■ 
The  intuition  of  this  result  is  straightforward.  The  country  that  is  fully  specialized  on  the 
production of the homogeneous good unambiguously gains from trade integration because the 
access to the manufacturing goods that are produced by the other country becomes cheaper. The 
country that hosts both industries will not be worse off under trade integration. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper explores the role of country asymmetries for trade and industrial policies in a two-
sector general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. We consider an extensive list of 
factors that determine the conditions of doing business: technology access, market (country) 
size, market entry costs, exit rates, fixed costs to serve markets, the trade infrastructure, and 
Ricardian productivity differences. Our analysis delivers a number of novel results. First, trade 
policies, infrastructure policies and industrial policies which improve the business conditions in 
one  country  have  negative  productivity  and  welfare  effects  on  the  trading  partner.  Second, 
symmetric trade liberalization is immiserizing for a trading partner whose business conditions 
are  inferior.  Third,  there  are  gains  from  trade  even  for  a  country  whose  monopolistically 
competitive sector with heterogeneous firms is wiped out by the switch from autarky to trade. 19 
The analytical tractability of our model allows us to work out these effects in a very slim way 
and it also allows us to synthesize previous policy findings very compactly. The ease with 
which the model can be employed to address country asymmetries should make it an attractive 
tool to study the endogenous choice of policies and to address political economy applications in 
future work. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under autarky 
In equilibrium, the aggregate expenditure on manufacturing has to be equal to the aggregate 
revenue  of  manufacturing  firms,  ( ) j b ~ r M L = .  Using  ( ) ( ) f w r s j j j
s 1 * / ~ ~ -
= , 
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k , and the equilibrium cutoff (5), the number of active firms can be 
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b s 1 -
= . Using  aut M  and  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k  in (4),  yields the price level, 
( )
( ) ( )( )
* 1 / 1 / 1 / 1 / aut aut w f L P rj s b
s s s - - =  and the indirect utility of a household is then as in eq. (6). 
Appendix B – The link between the productivity cutoffs in the open economy 
(i)  From  the  ZCP  conditions  it  follows  that  ( ) i i i i i i i f w L P r s b rj j
s
= =
-1 * *) (  and 
( ) xi i j j xi i ij xi xi f w L P w r s b rj t j
s s
= =
- - 1 1 * * / ) ( . Consequently, we have 
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        (B3) 
Combining  (B1)  and  (B3)  leads  to 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  where 
( )
) 1 /( 1 /
- º
s t i xi ij i f f t . 
(ii) We assume that only firms that serve the domestic market can export, i.e. 
* *
i xi j j > . From 
(B3) it follows that this holds true whenever  ( ) ( )( ) 1 / / /
) 1 /( 1 ) 1 /( 1 >
- - s s t j i j i i xi ij L L P P f f . Substituting 
( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s  and rearranging yields  ( ) ( )
1 * * 1 / / /
- - >
s s s j j t j i i j ij j xi w w f f . 
Note that in Demidova (2008) the condition 
* *
i xi j j >  implies 
* *
j xi j j >  (i.e. that a domestic firm 
finds it easier to break even in its domestic market than a foreign exporter does) since her model 22 
assumes  1 = W .  However,  in  the  presence  of  a  possibly  large  wage  differential  it  is  quite 
conceivable that an exporting firm might find it easier to break even than a local firm does. 
Hence, the implication will not carry over to our model, in general. 
Appendix C: Determination of equilibrium cutoffs in the open economy 
The free entry condition (FEC) for country i is given by  
  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] i ei i xi xi xi i i i i i f w G G d j j j p E j j j j p E j × × = > × - + > × -
* * * * ) ( 1 ) ( 1     (C1) 
As  ( ) ( ) i i i i f w r - = s j j p / , we can write the expected domestic profits as 
    ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] i i i i i i f w r - > = >
* * 1
j j j E
s
j j j p E  
Using  ( ) i i i i L P w r b rj j
s s 1 1 / ) (
- - =  and the Pareto specification we get 








= > i i
i i









j j j p E  
On substituting  ( ) i i i i f w r s j =
*  which is implied by the domestic ZCPC  ( ) 0
* = i i j p , we have:  








j j j p E         (C2) 
The expected export profits are determined in the same manner. Now we use export profits, 
export revenue, the previous parameterizations as well as the export ZCPC to obtain:  








j j j p E         (C3) 
Substituting  (C2)  and  (C3)  into  (C1)  and  using  ( )
k
i i i G j j j / 1 ) ( min - =  yields 






























.  Writing  this  equation  out  for 
F H i , =  and  using  the  relationships  between  export  cutoffs  and  domestic  cutoffs, 
* ) 1 /( *
F H xH t W j j
s s - - =  and 
* ) 1 /( *
H F xF t W j j
s s - =  as  derived  in  appendix  B  yields  two  equations 
which can be solved for the cutoffs 
*
H j  and 
*
F j  as stated in eq. (7). 
Appendix D: Firm masses, the price level and indirect utility under trade 
Start  with  the  condition  of  balanced  trade  (eq.  (8))  and  substitute  i i i i i r w L M / g =  where 
( ) ( ) xi xi xi i i i r cprob r r j j ~ ~ + º ,  H H a w / 1 =  and  F F F H H H F H w L w L L L g g b + = + ) ( .  Solving  for  the 






























































































º -  is  an  increasing  measure  of  relative 
conditions favoring business in H  (against F ). Using  i g , the masses of firms are immediately 
implied  by  i i i i i w L r M g =  where  ( ) i i r j ~  follows  from  the  domestic  ZCPC  and  is  given  by 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 / ~ - - = s s j k w f k r i i i i . Hence, we have 
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The number of exporting firms is implied by  i xi xi M cprob M =  and the mass of entrants follows 






i M M d j j
*
min
- = .  The  consumption  variety  available  in  country  i  is 
xj i ti M M M + = .  
With  the  price  setting  rule  defined  by  eq.  (3),  the  price  level  can  be  rewritten  as 
( ) ti i ti i p M P j s ~ 1
1
× = - .  The  variable  ( ) ( ) [ ] { } 1
1
1 1 1 1 ~ / ~ / 1 ~ - - - - - + = s s s s s j t j j xj ji i j xj i i ti ti w w M M M  can  be 
interpreted as an average productivity of all firms (domestic and foreign) that serve consumers 
in country i . Consumers in country i  spend  ( ) i ti i ti L r M b j = ~  on manufacturing varieties and 
the  average  firm  revenue  is  related  to  the  revenue  of  the  cutoff  firm  according  to 
( ) ( ) ( )
* 1 * / ~ ~
i i i ti ti i r r j j j j
s- = . With  ( ) i i i i f w r s j =
*  it follows that  ( ) i i i ti i ti f w L M s j j b
s
/ / ~ 1 * -
= . On 
substitution,  this  yields  for  the  price  level ( ) ( )
1 * ) 1 /( ) 1 /( 1 /
- - - = i i i i i w f L P rj s b
s s s .  Notice  that  the 
derivation of the price level is independent from the derivation of the productivity thresholds 
and observe that it is completely general (it does not depend on the Pareto parameterization).  
Appendix E: The model with specialization on the traditional industry in H   
Consider  that  only  F  has  manufacturing  firms,  whereas  country  H  only  produces  the 
homogeneous good. The price indices are then given by 


















F F s F s dz M p P  and  24 


















xF xF s F FH H s dz M p P  where  F s M ,  and  xF s M ,  is  the  number  of  domestic  and 
exporting firms from F , respectively. Like under non-specialization, potential entrepreneurs in 
F invest into the productivity lottery until the value of firm entry is driven to zero, so that the 































The  trade  balance  condition  from  the  perspective  of  F  is  given  by 
H H H H xF s xF xF s L w a L r M ) ( / ) ~ ( , , b j - - = . The LHS gives the value of country F ’s manufacturing 
exports, whereas the LHS represents the difference between the value of domestic production 
and  consumption  of  the  homogeneous  good.  Using  H H w a = / 1  and 
( ) ( ) [ ] 1 / ~
, - - = s s j k w f k r F xF xF s xF  which follows from the export ZCPC  ( ) 0
*
, = F s F j p , the mass 
of exporting firms is given by  [ ] xF F H xF s f w k L k M s b s / ) 1 ( , - - = . Furthermore, the total revenue 
of manufacturing firms must equal the sum of wages in that sector, i.e.  F F F F F s w L r M g = ,  where 
( ) ( ) xF s xF xF F s F F r cprob r r , ,
~ ~ j j + º  is the average revenue of a manufacturing firm in country F . 
Taking into account that worldwide expenditures on manufacturing goods must match the sum 
of wages earned in this sector,  F F F F H w L L L g b = + ) ( , we derive the mass of domestic firms as 
( )[ ]
( ) ( ) xF
k
xF s F s F F
F H
F s














= .  Using  F xF xF M cprob M = ,  where  ( )
k
xF F xF cprob
* * /j j = , 





















= . To ensure that 




, F s xF s j j > , we assume ( )( ) 1 / / > F xF H F f f L L . Using this 
link in the FEC yields the equilibrium cutoffs: 
  [ ]
k








F xF F aut xF s L L f f
/ 1 / 1 *
,
*
, / 1 / + × =j j   (E1) 
The equilibrium masses of firms immediately follow by 
    [ ]
F F
F




b s ) 1 (
,
- -
=   and   [ ]
xF F
H




b s ) 1 (
,
- -
=     (E2) 
To show that country H , which specializes in the homogeneous good, has gains from trade, we 
depart from the utility differential between the case with trade but no manufacturing firms in H  
and autarky,  ( ) H s H aut H aut H s P P v v v , , , , / ln b D = - º . The utility differential is determined by the 




) 1 /( 1
,
) 1 /( 1
,
1










= ∫ F xF s xF s FH
z




s ,  the  number  of  exporting 
firms from eq. (E2),  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) * 1 / 1 1 / ~ j s j
s- - - = k k  and the equilibrium cutoffs as given by eq. 
(E1), the ratio of price indices is given by  





























j d D F           (E3) 
From eq. (D1) we know that there are no manufacturing firms in H  whenever  F
L F D
j £







L F , respectively. Hence, it immediately follows from (E3) that there are gains from 
trade even if trade opening forces country H  into full specialization on the traditional good. 